Giving or Taking: The Role of Dispositional Power Motivation and Positive Affect in Profit Maximization? by Markus Quirin et al.
MAX PLANCK SOCIETY
Preprints of the
Max Planck Institute for
Research on Collective Goods
Bonn 2008/15
Giving or Taking: 
The Role of Dispositional 
Power Motivation and 
Positive Affect in Proﬁ  t 
Maximization
Markus Quirin / 
Martin Beckenkamp / Julius KuhlPreprints of the 
Max Planck Institute 
for Research on Collective Goods  Bonn 2008/15
Giving or Taking: The Role of Dispositional Power  
Motivation and Positive Affect in Proﬁt Maximization 




Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, D-53113 Bonn 
http://www.coll.mpg.de 
Giving or Taking: The Role of Dispositional Power Motivation and 









Socio-economic decisions are commonly explained by rational cost vs. benefit considerations, 
whereas person variables have not usually been considered. The present study aims at investi-
gating the degree to which dispositional power motivation and affective states predict socio-
economic decisions. The power motive was assessed both indirectly and directly using a 
TAT-like picture test and a power motive self-report, respectively. After nine months, 62 stu-
dents completed an affect rating and performed on a money allocation task (Social Values 
Questionnaire). We hypothesized and confirmed that dispositional power should be associated 
with a tendency to maximize one’s profit but to care less about another party’s profit. Addi-
tionally, positive affect showed effects in the same direction. The results are discussed with 
respect to a motivational approach explaining socio-economic behaviour.  
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The nature of selfish vs. pro-social behaviour in the context of limited resources challenges 
many disciplines like philosophy, biology, sociology, economics, and psychology. Despite 
high interest in this issue, the factors that influence socio-economic decisions into the direc-
tion of selfishness or generosity have not been fully identified yet. And indeed, the situation, 
the actor’s personality and affective states, and not least, interactions among these factors may 
influence socio-economic decisions. The present research investigates how the power motive, 
specifically the need for dominance, and the level of positive affect
1 influence independent 
socio-economic decisions, i.e., decisions taken without being influenced or receiving feed-
back by parties who are concerned in terms of being at advantage or at disadvantage (e.g., 
decisions about donations).  
Important aspects of such independent decisions have been investigated in experimental eco-
nomics via the so-called dictator game. In this game, one player makes a proposal of how to 
share sums of money to an anonymous other, whereas the other player does not have any in-
fluence on the decision. What factors may influence decisions in such a situation? Rational 
choice theory (RCT; cf. Heath, 1976) assumes that people base decisions exclusively on eco-
nomic, instrumental considerations, which has been aptly termed as homo oeconomicus 
(Rubinstein, 1998, p. 8 f.). Thus, RCT would predict that individuals always take decisions 
that maximize their profit. Within this classical conception of man as homo oeconomicus, 
selfishness and rationality go hand in hand and are synonymous. 
However, numerous experiments have demonstrated that it is not the case that persons in a 
situation of independent decisions and anonymity are purely selfish and decide not to share 
(cf. Camerer, 2003). Likewise, it could be demonstrated in numerous other experimental 
situations involving socio-economic decisions that people deviate systematically from the 
basic assumptions of classic RCT, suggesting that either influential constraints are not consid-
ered, or the models are basically imperfect (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1996; Budescu, Erev 
and Zwick, 1999). Reviewing the extant literature on trust games, McCabe, Rigdon, & Smith 
(2003, p. 268) concluded that “there is ample evidence suggesting that a considerable propor-
tion of play in two-person trust games deviates from that predicted by standard non-
cooperative game theory … A significant percentage of anonymously paired subjects arrive at 
cooperative outcomes.” Consequently, people often are much less selfish than RCT would 
expect. Such results stimulated theoretical work on reciprocity and inequity aversion (cf. List, 
2007; Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, Gintis, et al. 2005). 
But what kind of factors may moderate the balance between selfish and pro-social behaviour 
in rational decisions? As argued here, it is plausible to assume that individuals differ in the 
degree to which they behave individualistically or cooperatively. As outlined in the following 
section, this behavioural dichotomy may be associated with a personality trait commonly re-
                                        
1   In recent years the distinction between incidental and integral affects has been made. Integral affect arises 
in direct response to stimuli, while incidental affect arises from unrelated stimuli that carry over into the 
decision (cf. Rogers and Bazerman, in press). 
  
ferred to as the power motive, and this is why we were interested in investigating how this 
variable predicts socio-economic decisions. Additionally, we argue that many results referring 
to the influence of affects on socio-economic decisions may be explained by a dynamic moti-
vation approach. We think that such an approach may enrich current research about socio-
economic decisions and mental states and may have the potential to integrate inconsistent re-
sults from this area of research. 
The Role of the Power Motive 
In experimental economics, a variety of factors have been postulated and investigated that 
may provide explanations for non-selfish behaviour. For example, a number of studies found 
that behaviour is influenced by fairness norms (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). In a similar vein, 
there is evidence supporting inequity aversion. Corresponding models that postulate that peo-
ple dislike differences between one’s own payoff and that of others, and that emotional arous-
als cause them to deviate from personal profit maximization (e.g., Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; 
Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; an extensive discussion of these approaches can be found in Nicklisch, 
2006). Moreover, it has been revealed that emotions and punishment sentiments foster the 
enforcement of such fairness norms (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Gürerk, Irlenbusch & Rocken-
bach, 2006). 
In this article, we explore the role of the power motive in moderating socio-economical be-
haviour. This motive refers to individual differences in the human tendency to be dominant 
and to achieve control over means that can be used to influence other individuals (Veroff, 
1957). Striving for status, dominance, superiority, or controlling positions are thus typical 
examples of manifestations of the power motive (Winter, 1973). In this vein, an impressive 
finding is that differences in the strength of the power motive among the first twelve US 
presidents, as assessed through an analysis of their maiden speech, were associated with the 
number of cabinet changes and the number of war entries (Donley & Winter, 1970; see also 
Winter, 1987). There is no doubt that money is one, if not the strongest, means to influence 
others because money has been providing the basis for human’s subsistence in most cultures 
for thousands of years. Possessing lots of money is a symbol of high status and control over 
others and should therefore be particularly rewarding to individuals who have a strong power 
motive compared to those who have a low power motive.  
The power motive is inherently associated with the establishment of hierarchical relationships 
in which the person dominates over others. By contrast, fairness norms and inequity aversion 
refer to symmetrical relationships incompatible with the power motive to some degree. How-
ever, this does not imply that individuals with a high power motive never behave in a fair 
way. Rather, and in line with dynamic motivation theories (e.g., Kuhl, 2001; Powers, 1973), 
there are a variety of dynamic motivational sources integrated in an individual that compete to 
influence behaviour. For example, individuals high in power motivation may be fair in the 
presence of others because they may at the same time be sensitive to social reward or reputa- 
tion, fostering socially desirable behaviour. By contrast, their tendency to behave in an indi-
vidualistic way, or even to strive for means that putatively increase control over others (e.g., 
money), is likely to outweigh potential fairness norms or inequity aversions in situations that 
do not permit feedback from others, as realized in the dictator game. 
Two pioneer studies provided direct evidence of effects of the power motive on socio-
economic behaviour (Schnackers & Kleinbeck, 1975; Terhune, 1968). In both studies, the 
authors indirectly assessed dispositional power using the Thematic Apperception Test 
(Murray, 1935). In this test written stories about ambiguous pictures are analyzed and scored 
by experts for contexts related to the power motive according to standardized coding systems 
to provide an index of the “implicit” power motive (e.g., Uleman, 1966; Veroff, 1957; Winter, 
1973). First, Terhune (1968) had his participants play three different games using different 
variants of the broadly applied prisoner’s dilemma game: a one-shot-game, and a repeated 30-
period prisoner’s dilemma, one run without communication and another run with communica-
tion. Individuals with a strong power motive turned out to be most competitive and exploitive 
players. Likewise, Schnackers and Kleinbeck (1975) had groups of three individuals play a 
bargaining game called “con game”. Participants played dice and had power cards at their 
disposal with which they could multiply their points in order to approach the goal. Two play-
ers could form a coalition against the third player to achieve the goal jointly and to make 
agreements about how to share the payoff. Participants were allowed to violate and form coa-
litions as often as they wanted. The authors found that individuals with a strong power motive 
manipulated others in order to win the game. Specifically, high power motivation was associ-
ated with the number of propositions, formations, and violations of coalitions. Moreover, 
power motivation was associated with playing the other players off against each other, chang-
ing the payoff agreements for their own benefit, and winning the game. 
The results of both studies are in line with findings from research on socio-economic deci-
sions which show that individuals who are concerned about their own payoffs (classified as 
selfish) strongly evaluate the behaviour of the other player in terms of potency, suggesting 
that selfish individuals understand social dilemmas as a situation of might rather than morality 
(cf. Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, & Suhre, 1986; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994)
2. 
The notion that the power motive should play a role in socio-economic decisions is also com-
patible with more recent research on personality influences on socio-economic decision-
making. Scheres and Sanfey (2006) predicted socio-economic decisions by differences in the 
dispositional sensitivity towards rewarding stimuli, a trait that seems to be associated with 
high power motivation (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Andersen 2003). Specifically, participants 
played both the dictator game, as described above, and the ultimatum game. The ultimatum 
game is similar to the dictator game but differs in that the respondent can reject the offer of 
the proposing person and “burn” the whole money by this rejection. Consistent with the au-
                                        
2   This again raises the question how this sensitivty to power differences is related to two different motiva-
tions for defections: fear and greed. This undoubtly interesting question is not discussed in the paper at 
hand.  
thors’ expectations, participants with a high sensitivity towards reward withheld more money 
in the dictator game. However, in contrast to their expectations, high sensitivity was associ-
ated with higher offers in the interactive ultimatum game, a finding that the authors attribute 
to a tendency of the initial attempts of reward-sensitive individuals to maximize the likelihood 
of reward (which is higher in case of good offers in the ultimatum game, but is not able to be 
influenced in the dictator game). The amount of reward is considered as secondary criterion 
only, according to this view. In a study by Brandstätter and Königstein (2001), participants 
played the “ultimatum game with advance production”, that is, an ultimatum game where the 
stock of the ultimatum game is determined by a preceding common production that depends 
both on the investment of the proposing person and the respondent. Proposers ranked high in 
the 16 PF personality dimensions of independence and tough-mindedness, both being aspects 
that should be inherently associated with the power motive, demanded higher return shares of 
the common investment than proposers ranked low in these dimensions. 
Theoretical considerations and empirical evidence reported above suggests that the power 
motive is a determinant of socio-economic behaviour. Specifically, it may be assumed that a 
strong power motive implies an “egoistic” bias towards satisfying needs and goals of one’s 
own rather than those of other individuals. Therefore, particularly in situations that do not 
permit social feedback on the decisions with the consequence that the influence of normative 
behaviour and social desirability tendencies is weakened, such as in the dictator game, the 
postulated tendency to maximize personal outcomes of individuals with high levels of power 
motivation should be uncovered. 
The Role of Affective States 
Additional research demonstrates the impact of affective states on socio-economic decisions. 
Many studies suggest that positive mood fosters pro-social behaviour and cooperation (cf. 
Carlson, Charlin, & Miller, 1988; Fessler & Haley, 2003), and that affective states and emo-
tions can influence economic decisions (Lerner, Small & Loewenstein, 2004). Although this 
idea seems plausible, contrasting findings have been reported that require more complex 
models for explanation (see Hertel, 1999, for a review). For example, Hertel & Fiedler (1994) 
demonstrate that it is not positive affect per se that influences the degree of cooperativeness. 
According to their results, positive affect raises the behavioural variance and, therefore, posi-
tive affect has only an indirect influence on the probability for cooperativeness. If so, positive 
mood should particularly raise average cooperativeness if the individual was not yet coopera-
tive before and has not yet developed a consistent strategy. Likewise, Hertel, Neuhof, Theuer, 
& Kerr (2000) only found indirect effects of mood on cooperation. Using an interactive game, 
they found that happy participants mimic the moves of their opponents, whereas sad partici-
pants make their moves on a more detached analysis of the game itself. This is congruent with 
the literature which states that happy participants are socially more interactive than sad par-
ticipants (cf. de Mesquita & McDermott, 2004).  
According to personality systems interactions (PSI) theory (Kuhl, 2000, 2001), positive affect 
plays an important role in decision-making. Specifically, PSI theory holds that positive affect 
serves as a motor for the enactment of intentions (see Kuhl & Kazén, 1999, for empirical evi-
dence). Congruent with this notion, Sanna, Parks, and Chang (2003, Study 4), using a re-
source dilemma game, induced either competitive or cooperative goals by manipulating the 
instructions. Individuals in positive mood as induced via music acted more competitively 
when they had competitive goals in mind, but more cooperatively when they had cooperative 
goals in mind. In a similar vein, Hertel and Fiedler (1998) tested the influence of positive vs. 
negative attributes associated with either cooperation or competition in a socio-economic al-
location task that was a modification of the Ring-Measure-Value scale (Liebrand & 
McClintock, 1988). If individuals were primed with to-be-learned negative attributes associ-
ated with competition (e.g., selfish, egocentric, arrogant, destructive, unfair, domineering, 
aggressive), they showed less cooperative behaviour. By contrast, if individuals learned posi-
tive attributes associated with cooperation (e.g., constructive, truthful, supportive, helpful, 
fair, etc.), they showed more cooperation.  
Notably, individuals who derive positive affect from greediness rather than from fairness were 
more selfish in a dictator game, in which individuals have to make decisions on allocations 
independently, but not in an ultimatum game, in which the proposals of the individuals de-
pend on the acceptance of the responders (Haselhuhn & Mellers, 2005). These results suggest 
selfishness is a function of an interaction between positive affect, power motivation and struc-
ture of the game. If greediness cannot be punished, the power motive and positive affect may 
raise selfish behaviour, whereas in situations where punishment or refusal is possible, positive 
affect and the power motive may raise the probability of investing in considerations or reason-
ing about how much selfishness the other will be willing to accept. 
In sum, whereas many studies suggest that positive affect engenders pro-social behaviour, 
recent studies suggest more complex ways in which positive affect influences socio-economic 
behaviour, with some evidence even suggesting that positive affect can foster selfish behav-
iour, particularly in situations where independent individualistic goals are activated, as it is 
the case, for example, in dictator games.  
Present Research and Hypotheses 
The present work aims at investigating the degree to which decision-making in socio-
economic situations depends on dispositional power motivation and affective states. Because 
personality tests are to some degree influenced by situational variables (Carver & Scheier, 
2004), applying a longer time period between assessments of the power motive and the behav-
ioural task would ensure that our predictions are based on stable rather than transient variance 
of power motivation. Therefore, we capitalized on a longitudinal approach measuring both 
implicit and explicit (self-reported) power motives nine months prior to the assessment of  
socio-economic decisions. Consequently, findings of relationships between power motive 
dispositions and behavioural outcomes would speak for the ecological validity of the study.  
To assess the implicit and explicit power motive we used a recently developed TAT-like op-
erant motive test (Kuhl et al., 2003) and a self-report measure of motives (Kuhl, 2005; see 
also Kuhl, Kazén, & Koole, 2006), respectively. Affective states were assessed at the begin-
ning of the experiment using the Positive And Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The PANAS allows for the assessment of positive and negative 
affect as two dimensions. Distinguishing between the two affective states is meaningful be-
cause they have shown to have differential effects on cognition and behaviour (cf. Kuhl, 
2000). A separate analysis of the role of positive vs. negative affect would contribute to the 
yet unanswered question of which of the two affective components influences socio-economic 
decisions and in which way. After the application of the PANAS, socio-economic decisions 
were assessed with the Ring Measure of Social Values (Liebrand & McClintock, 1988). In 
this measure, participants are asked to decide between two alternatives to share out a certain 
amount of money between themselves and another party. The Ring Measure was originally 
conceptualized as a trait rather than a state measure of social values. However, each of the 
decisions in the Ring Measure of Social Values is similar to the dictator game, and asking 
individuals to allocate amounts of money to themselves and another person is a real behav-
ioural measure that can also be influenced by situational variables such as affect, the investi-
gation of which constituted a major goal of the study. Consistent with this notion, the Ring 
Measure was successfully applied as a state (dependent) measure in previous research (e.g., 
Hertel & Fiedler, 1998; Poppe & Valkenburg, 2002). In contrast to the dictator game, in 
which participants are asked to divide a constant sum of money between themselves and an 
anonymous recipient, the Ring Measure provides the opportunity to maximize joint payoff 
and, as a result, to realize mutual benefit. Moreover, the final outcome depends on the deci-
sions of both players, whereas in the dictator game each player determines the final outcome 
alone (cf. Brosig, 2002). 
We hypothesized that the power motive should be positively associated with selfish behav-
iour, i.e., the so-called “rational choice” to maximize the financial outcome on one’s own. 
However, we have no clear-cut hypothesis about the relationship between the power motive 
and the degree to which one cares about the negative financial outcome of the other player, 
that is, about a potential tendency to diminish the other’s payoff (“competition” or “sadism”). 
Thus, we assumed that the power motive would be related to a non-social orientation in eco-
nomical decisions if self-interest is in conflict with the social orientation. Additionally, we 
expected that positive affect would foster selfish decisions because those are taken independ-
ently, which was mentioned in the instruction. In this regard, the present task is very similar 
to the dictator game and therefore both the power motive and positive affect should directly 
influence selfish decisions.  
Method 
Participants and Course of the Study 
Eighty-eight students (56 female and 32 male) studying diverse disciplines at the University 
of Osnabrueck participated in the study. They were between 19 and 39 years old (M = 24.2, 
SD = 4.2). The present study was part of a longitudinal study on the relationship of motives 
and affective states on cognition and behaviour. In a first session, participants completed a 
battery of personality questionnaires including the motive measures. Nine months later, all 
students were asked about their interest in taking part in the study. 62 individuals decided to 
take part. Participants were informed that the upcoming session would be about how people 
allocate certain amounts of money, without giving further details at this point of time. 
Upon arrival, participants were separately situated in small booths equipped with a desk, a 
chair, and a computer. Participants completed the PANAS scale and were introduced to the 
“Money Allocation Game” (Ring Measure of Social Values), which requires assigning certain 
amounts of money to oneself and to another participant (see below). As an incentive, we paid 
between 2 and 12.80 Euro, according to the total payoff achieved by the participant in this 
session. 
Material 
Power Motive and Affective States 
The Operant Motive Test (OMT; Kuhl et al., 2003; Scheffer, Kuhl, & Eichstaedt, 2003) was 
used to measure individual differences in the implicit power motive. The OMT is a modified 
TAT technique (Murray, 1943), in which participants are asked to invent a story for each of 
15 schematic drawings of social interactions. Participants are instructed to expose their spon-
taneous associations to the following four questions without the necessity to write down the 
entire story: (1) “What is important for the person in this situation and what is the person do-
ing?”, (2) “How does the person feel?”, (3) “Why does the person feel this way?”, and (4) 
“How does the story end?”. An example of typical power-related response may be: “The per-
son on the picture is a guide and tells the tourists details about the town. He likes to be the 
centre of attention. He feels proud because the others are impressed about his knowledge. Fi-
nally, the tourists make a lot of compliments in the end, which the guide enjoys very much.” 
Pictures that elicit a power theme (except for power–related anxiety) add a point on the power 
scale from 0 to 15. OMT scoring was carried out by well-trained assistants who had (a) previ-
ously coded more than a thousand OMTs, (b) received continuous feedback concerning their 
agreement with expert ratings over a period of three years, and (c) reached an average inter-
rater agreement above .85. Evidence confirming the validity of the OMT has been reported in 
Baumann, Kaschel, & Kuhl, 2005; Kuhl & Scheffer (1999) and Scheffer (2001).  
To assess the explicit power motive, we used the Power Dominance scale of the Motive En-
actment Test (Kuhl, 1999; see also Kuhl, Kazén, & Koole, 2006). This scale expresses the 
degree to which individuals describe their behaviour as being guided by strivings for domi-
nance, status, and control over others. This scale consists of four items and has a Cronbach 
alpha of .72 (Kuhl, 2005). The items of the scale can be rated as follows: (1) “not at all”, (2) 
“somewhat”, (3) “pretty much”, and (4) “absolutely”. An example item is “When I am in a 
group, I often express my opinions with vigour”. 
We assessed affective states by the commonly applied positive vs. negative affect scales of the 
PANAS (Watson et al., 1988; for the German version, see Krohne, Egloff, Kohlmann, & 
Tausch, 1996). Based on 10 positive and 10 negative adjectives, participants are asked to rate 
their current affective states on a 5-point-Likert scale ranging from (1) very slightly or not at 
all to (5) extremely. 
Selfish versus Pro-social Behaviour 
To assess selfish and pro-social behaviour as the major criterion variables in the present study, 
we used a computerized form of the Ring Measure Questionnaire of Social Values (Liebrand 
& McClintock, 1988). The questionnaire contains 24 subsequently presented items, each rep-
resenting two imaginary money distributions between oneself and a virtual other player. The 
participants were instructed to imagine that they played with an anonymous other person who 
receives the same items, and that the individual outcomes were determined by the choices of 
both: the person herself and the other person. For example, one item consists in a choice be-
tween alternative 1 - 15.00 Euro to oneself and 0.00 Euro to the other player - or alternative 2 
with 14.50 Euro to oneself and 3.90 Euro to the other player. With respect to this item, alter-
native 1 is preferred by individualistic subjects, whereas a preference for alternative 2 indi-
cates co-operative tendencies.  
The Ring Measure Questionnaire measures social values by assessing the value that partici-
pants attach to their own payoffs and the payoffs of others in socio-economic allocations (see 
also Liebrand & Dehue, 1996). The social value of a subject is represented by a vector from 
the centre of the circle (“ring”). The ring is in a plane containing outcomes to self on the hori-
zontal axis, and outcomes to other on the vertical axis. The angle of the vector gives the social 
values orientation. An angle of -45° refers to competitive, an angle of 0° to individualistic, 
and an angle of 45° to cooperative decisions. The length of the vector gives the respective 
reliability of the measure and thus refers to the degree to which a person showed consistency 
in his responses on 24 socio-economic allocation tasks.  
Because the angle measure of social value orientation is a compound of self and other as-
signments, the differential influence of psychological variables on the tendency to maximize 
one’s own profit (individualistic tendencies) and the tendency to maximize the profit of an-
other person (pro-social tendencies) cannot be investigated. Therefore, we decided to addi- 
tionally investigate correlations of psychological variables with the two independent dimen-
sions of self vs. other assignments separately. Self-assignments vs. other assignments are 
simply the sum of money a person assigns to himself vs. to the other person, respectively. We 
expected to obtain more specific information about what dimension describing socio-
economic decisions (i.e., individualistic vs. pro-social) is related to the power motive or af-
fect. 
Participants were instructed as follows: In the following you will obtain a number of decision 
tasks in which you are asked to assign a certain amount of money to yourself and another 
party. The other party is another participant in this study who was randomly assigned to you 
as a player. In each of the decision tasks, you can always choose between two options defin-
ing how the sum of money can be shared out between you and the other person. The other 
person has been given exactly the same tasks. Note that your payoff depends on both the way 
you make your decision and the way the other person makes his or her decision. The same is 
valid for the other person’s payoff. You will receive the money, which will be between 2 and 
12.80 Euro, after the experiment.  
Results 
In the present study, three individuals showed consistency values of zero and were therefore 
removed from data analysis. Thus, we went on with data from 59 participants. Table 1 shows 
Pearson correlations between social behaviour variables, implicit and explicit power motive, 
and positive and negative affect. Congruent with our hypothesis, the implicit power motive 
inversely predicted social values orientation, r = -.26, p < .05. By contrast, the explicit power 
motive was unrelated to social values orientation, r = -.11, ns. Likewise, positive and negative 
affect were unrelated to social values orientation, r = -.06, ns, and r = -.09, ns, respectively. 
To provide a microanalysis of the relationships of power motive and positive affect with so-
cial behaviour, we had a more thorough look at how the score for social values orientation is 
composed of selfish and pro-social behavioural components (self- vs. other- allocation, re-
spectively) and how those are related to the power motive and affect. The high positive corre-
lation of social values with other-allocation, r = .93, p < .001, and the weaker but nevertheless 
highly significant negative correlation of social values with self-allocation, r = -.44, p < .001, 
should not be interpreted empirically, but is a property that can be deduced from the construc-
tion of the RMV-scale: A negative correlation between social values and self-allocation can 
be expected when the majority of the subjects has social values >= 0° on the ring
3, as well as 
the negative correlation between self and other (r = -.44, p < .001). However, it is interesting 
to find that selfish behaviour was highly positively correlated to behaviour consistency, r = 
.65, p < .001, whereas pro-social behaviour was not significantly correlated with behaviour 
consistency, r = .14, ns. This is in line with findings from Liebrand and McClintock (1988) 
                                        
3   A correlation of 0 would be expected if the distribution above and below a social value of 0° is the same.  
showing that co-operators and competitors have longer response latencies than altruists and 
individualists. In contrast to their interpretation, from our point of view this can be explained 
by social values being confounded with the possibility to make use of easy heuristics that 
nevertheless lead to consistent answers. Thus, an individualistic participant (0°) will always 
choose the alternative that gives him a higher payoff. However, with respect to a cooperative 
or competitive participant (45° and -45°) there is no such easy heuristic that guarantees con-
sistent answers with respect to the 24 socio-economic decision tasks given in the Ring-
Measure-Value scale. To our knowledge, the problem that cognitive complexity may be con-
founded with the reliability of different social values measured by the Ring scale has not yet 
been discussed in the literature so far. 
In line with our hypothesis, both the implicit and explicit power motive were associated with 
selfish behaviour, r = .36, p < .01 (one-tailed), and r = .25, p < 0.05 (one-tailed), respectively, 
but not with pro-social behaviour, r = -.13, ns, and r = -.11, ns. This finding suggests that the 
variance of social values orientation explained by the implicit power motive can be mainly 
attributed to the degree to which individuals care about their own outcome and not so much 
about relative advantages between the own outcome in relation to the outcome of the other 
person.
4 To test whether the implicit or the explicit measure predict selfish behaviour inde-
pendently of each other, we conducted partial correlations. When the explicit power motive 
was partialed out, the implicit power motive and self-allocation remained significant at rp = 
.35, p < .01. When the correlative influence of implicit power motive was removed, the ex-
plicit power motive remained significant at rp = .23, p < .05 (one-tailed). This suggests that 
the effect of one type of power motive on self-allocations cannot be explained by the effect of 
the other type. 
Whereas negative affect was unrelated to selfish behaviour, r = -.07, ns, positive affect was 
positively related to selfish behaviour, r = .44, p < .001. However, positive affect was also 
associated with behavioural consistency, r = .32, p < .05, and behavioural consistency, in turn, 
was associated with individualistic behaviour, r = .28, p < .05. Therefore, it cannot be ex-
cluded that positive affect is only indirectly associated with selfish behaviour because partici-
pants who have a low motivation to perform the task correctly, as indicated by the consistency 
measure, receive a lower payoff because they do not endeavour to maximize their profit. To 
test this critical objection, we correlated positive affect and self-allocation, while we removed 
the correlative influence of behaviour consistency. Positive affect remained positively corre-
lated with selfish behaviour, rp = .27, p < .05. This suggests an influence of positive affect on 
selfish behaviour that is independent of the influence from the motivation to perform the task 
appropriately. 
In a further set of analyses, we tested whether the effects of positive affect and power motive 
on selfish behaviour were independent of each other. In a first analysis, we included the 
                                        
4   Above that, the small and non-significant negative deviation of the low correlation from zero could also 
be explained by the relatively low number of social values below 0°.  
power motive and positive affect as predictors of self-allocation in a multiple regression 
analysis after having centred these variables (Aiken & West, 1991). We found that the effect 
on self-allocation remained significant for either variable, power motive, β = .29, p = .016, 
and positive affect, β = .35, p = .004. This suggests that the effect of one of the two variables 
on self-allocation cannot be explained by the effect of the other. Analogously, we conducted a 
multiple regression using the explicit power motive instead of the implicit one. In contrast to 
the implicit power motive, the explicit power motive became non-significant, β = .11, p = 
.419, when positive affect was included as a further predictor. Positive affect, however, re-
mained a significant predictor, β = .36, p = .009. To test whether positive affect may mediate 
the effect of the explicit power motive on selfish behaviour, we drew on the Sobel test (see 
Baron & Kenny, 1986), which was significant, Z = 2.14, p < .032. 
Discussion 
The present study investigated the degree to which the tendency to behave in a selfish or pro-
social way in a limited-resource game of independent socio-economic decisions is a function 
of inter-individual differences in dispositional power motivation and affective states. Because 
a high power motive is commonly associated with individualistic behaviour and status con-
cerns, we hypothesized and confirmed that dispositional power, in particular if measured by 
the indirect test, inversely predicts social values orientation in economic decision-making. By 
contrast, affective states were unrelated to social values orientation but were strongly related 
to selfish allocations. This means that positive affect triggers selfish decisions but that it is 
unrelated to how people behave to others, i.e., either harmful (competitors) or benevolent (co-
operators).  
Consistent with our hypothesis, we found that implicit and explicit power motives showed 
independent effects, paralleling previous research on implicit and explicit motives in general 
and suggesting incremental validity of the implicit motive test. The power motive was unre-
lated to pro-social behaviour. This finding suggests that, in general, individuals with a high 
power motive do not care about the outcome of the other, which means that they neither at-
tempt to diminish the other’s outcome (“competition”) nor to increase the other’s outcome 
(“cooperation”). It is important to note that the socio-economic situation was about mostly 
independent decisions and therefore it may not be generalized to interactive games in general. 
Indeed, the studies by Terhune (1968) and Schnackers and Kleinbeck (1974), both of which 
used interactive games, showed that individuals with a strong power motive showed competi-
tive behaviour in a one-shot game and cooperated in the long run in iterated games. 
Our hypothesis of a positive relationship between power motive and selfish behaviour is 
strengthened by the fact that it was supported by two methodically different assessments of 
the power motive, a picture story test and a self-report test. At the same time, implicit and 
explicit power were positively but not non-significantly correlated, which is in line with the 
literature showing low or absent relationships between implicit and explicit motives (e.g.,  
Bornstein, 2002). This pattern of relationships suggests that different components of socio-
economic decision-making may have been predicted by the two motives differentially, more 
spontaneous vs. more controlled components, presumably (McClelland et al., 1989). How-
ever, these components cannot be distinguished on the basis of the present data and may 
therefore be controlled in future research. 
The present study adds to the literature on influences of personality on socio-economic deci-
sions. Notably, much previous research on this issue produced indecisive results (for a review, 
see Thompson, 1990), leaving several theorists to detach importance to personality as a poten-
tial determinant (e.g., Davis-Blake, 1989; Lewicki, 1994). One reason for indecisive results 
may have been (a) a disregard of dynamic motivational factors and external conditions (dif-
ferent situations), which may strongly influence socio-economic behaviour, as well as (b) an 
almost exclusive usage of self-report personality measures. Our results suggest that the power 
motive has a direct impact on selfish behaviour in situations where the opponent does not 
have any opportunity to modify a decision (as is the case in the dictator game), and it is plau-
sible to assume that it is weakened in social situations (e.g., the ultimatum game), in which 
fairness norms and punishment sentiments of the opponent need to be considered. Taking this 
view, it also seems plausible that individuals with a highly developed power motive should 
make relatively strong efforts in assessing the strategic attitudes of the opponent in strategic 
situations like the ultimatum game, in order to estimate how far they can go without burning 
the money. This consideration is in line with van Lange and Kuhlman (1994), who found that 
in social dilemmas competitive individuals (i.e., in our interpretation, individuals with high 
power motivations) evaluate their opponents with respect to their intelligence, whereas coop-
erative subjects evaluate their opponents with respect to their morality. Future research is 
needed to investigate these assumptions, for example by directly manipulating this aspect. 
The present study ties on older studies (Terhune, 1968; Schnackers & Kleinbeck, 1975) which 
also pointed to the role of the implicit power motive in socio-economic decision-making. Ex-
cept for these few studies, this issue has not yet been a focus of extant systematic investiga-
tion. Particularly, the aspect of implicitness may be fruitful in economic research because pre-
vious research has demonstrated that implicit (indirectly assessed) aspects are advantageous in 
predicting non-deliberate behaviour, whereas explicit (directly assessed) aspects are advanta-
geous in predicting socially desirable behaviour (Asendorpf et al., 2002; McClelland et al., 
1989). Therefore, whenever decisions are made that can be expected to be barely influenced 
by social desirability tendencies, implicit measures may be more appropriate to predict such 
decisions.  
Positive affect was significantly associated with self-allocation, but not with other-allocation, 
even after behaviour consistency was controlled for. Consequently, positive affect influenced 
selfish behaviour independently from a potential lack of task motivation. This finding is con-
gruent with Personality Systems Interactions theory, which relies on the notion of a independ-
ent effects of positive and negative affects. Specifically, the presence of positive but not the 
absence of negative affect supports the enactment of intentions, whereas the presence of nega- 
tive affect but not the absence of positive affect presumably constricts the spectrum of action 
alternatives and primes rigid behaviour (Kuhl, 2000, 2001). This interpretation is congruent 
with previous research (Hertel & Fiedler, 1998; Sanna et al., 2003), showing that positive af-
fect supports selfish behaviour when selfish schemas or goals were primed beforehand.  
Furthermore, our data suggest that the implicit power motive and positive affect influence 
individualistic behaviour independently. By contrast, the effect of the explicit power motive 
on individualistic behaviour could be explained by the effect of positive affect, which was 
positively correlated with the explicit power motive. This finding may reflect a general ener-
getic component of experienced power (Keltner et al., 2003). Consequently, an explicit (but 
not implicit) power motive may result in positive affect, which in turn may provide energy to 
pursue one’s individualistic goals. This interpretation is consistent with findings related to 
hemispheric lateralization. Specifically, cues that are explicitly related to power or positive 
affect (including power-related emotions such as anger) are associated with an activation of 
the left hemisphere (Davidson, 1993; Harmon-Jones & Allen, 2002; Kuhl & Kazén, 2008; 
Quirin, Hardung, Kazén, & Kuhl, 2008). Interestingly, this hemisphere seems to be special-
ized on linear thinking in terms of means-end relationships (Levy & Trevarthen, 1976), 
whereas the right hemisphere is related to a more creative cognitive style operating within 
extended experiential networks (Bowden et al., 2005). A means-end focus has been postulated 
as a basic component of the power motive (Veroff, 1957; Winter, 1994). In contrast to explicit 
sources of power motivation, implicit power needs may operate more spontaneously and thus 
more effortlessly, requiring less energy to pursue corresponding goals. However, further re-
search is needed to shed more light on the causal network between power motive and positive 
affect in influencing individualistic behaviour.  
It should be noted that to our best of our knowledge the majority of studies that have investi-
gated the influence of affect on selfish or pro-social behaviour have not differentiated between 
positive and negative affect, but regarded them as opposite poles of one dimension (cf. Ca-
cioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1999; Tellegen, Watson, & Clark, 1999, for discussions on the 
structure of affect). Thus, our findings on a unique influence of positive affect suggest that 
differentiating between the two affective components is a promising attempt to shed more 
light on the yet underexposed role of affective processes in economic decision-making. 
The present results are in line with many studies claiming that the traditional notion of homo 
oeconomicus who bases economic decisions exclusively on rational thoughts about profit 
maximization is insufficient. Prominently, the accurateness of the implicit power measure was 
above the explicit measure. Implicit motive measures tap into aspects of personality of which 
the individual is not necessarily aware, but nevertheless they exert an influence on behaviour 
(McClelland et al., 1989). Likewise, affective states can influence behaviour without the indi-
vidual knowing about this influence, even if the individual is aware of his current affective 
states. Therefore, both the implicit power motive and affective states have probably had an 
automatic influence on the socio-economic decisions made in the present study. Moreover, 
future research about socio-economic decisions should consider the distinction between im- 
plicit and explicit power motivations and investigate the implications of these motivations on 
economic decisions. The results so far are congruent with contemporary research on the influ-
ence of intuitive or automatic processes on human behaviour in general (Bargh, Chen, & Bur-
rows, 1996) and in economic decisions in particular (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et 
al., 2006). A vast neuroscientific research program evidences that much of our decisions are 
based on intuitive and non-deliberate processes. Specifically, regions that are not bound to 
rational deliberation, such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, revealed to be strongly in-
volved in appropriate economic decision-making that is sensitive and flexibly adapts to con-
textual factors such as situational changes or the reactions of interested parties (see Bechara & 
Damasio, 2005). 
The present study is not without limitations. Specifically, previous research suggests that the 
power motive can also foster pro-social behaviour in certain situations (e.g., McClelland, 
1970; Winter & Barenbaum, 1985). Specifically, in cases where an interaction partner who 
can be advised or supported by the actor (as an example of pro-social leadership), the actor’s 
power motive might even trigger pro-social behaviour. However, because our experimental 
settings involved non-visibility, non-presence, and anonymity of the other player, leadership 
motivation promoting pro-social leadership may not have been aroused (participants were 
only aware that the other player existed and that the money left to this player would be trans-
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